1. Affective and Natural Orders

An entry in the journal of early 19th century sensationalist philosopher Maine de Biran articulates a rather common thought about the way humans experience the natural patterns of the year: “each season has, not only its own kind or order of sensations, but also a fundamental feeling of existence which is both analogous to it and which is reproduced rather uniformly with each return of the same season” (77-8). In ordinary discourse, it is readily admitted that each season is associated with a particular set of emotions or affective tonalities. But if the correspondence between an order of feeling and an order that obtains in the physical world, which is to say, between an affective order and a natural order, is an analogy, who or what constructs such an analogy? How does it come about that affects get attached to regular, patterned changes in the environment? Such a process doubtless involves natural, social, individual, and even poetic forces, and is therefore a great deal more complex than Biran seems to think. Religion represents one relevant set of social and poetic forces for understanding how a seasonal affective order originates, gets perpetuated, and changes. Operating at the nexus of ritual, story, and seasonal patterns of the environment, religions determine a way of experiencing the world and its alterations. In this way, religions are one of the social, but also poetic, means by which an analogy between affective and natural orders gets constructed.

The present paper attempts to elaborate upon this thesis, taking as a kind of case study the religious lives of some circumpolar peoples. It has long been observed that social life in the Arctic regions, including the rituals enacted in and the stories transmitted by religious life, is strongly tied to the extreme alternation between winter days in which there is very little sunlight, and summer days in which the sun sets for only a very short period every day. Additionally, these regions have, in the past century alone, experienced significant changes in both the physical environment (the effects of climate change are perhaps nowhere as tangible as in the Arctic; see Shearer for a particularly dramatic journalistic account of these changes) and religious life (a result of Christian missionary work has been the conversion of many Inuit, for example, to Christianity). For these reasons, the question of the “analogy” between seasonal patterns in the natural world and the sensations tied to religious life is especially pertinent for an interpretation of human life in the earth’s circumpolar regions. In the second half of the present paper, we turn to some examples of life in these regions with our questions about seasonality in mind. First, however, it is necessary to make clear what exactly we might expect to learn about natural and affective orders from these examples, in the context of this brief paper. Many of us likely have a rough sense of what Biran means when he speaks about an analogy between the natural order and an order of feeling or sensations. But how can we make this intuitive sense of a connection...
between the experience of the natural world and affective life more precise? In this paper, I wish to outline the elements of a theoretical framework – a set of concepts, questions, and concerns – for interpreting the relationship between affective order and natural order. Specifically, I shall argue that Henri Lefebvre’s idea of “rhythmanalysis” and Augustin Berque’s idea of “mesology” hold particular promise for identifying what is at stake in the kinds of questions raised in the previous paragraphs. But the goal is not so much to offer a new methodology for empirical research, as it is to investigate the conditions of and constraints upon any circulation of meaning (and thus of any analogy) between social, natural, and affective temporal worlds. How does it come about, we ask, that religion gets inscribed upon the very bodies of individuals dwelling within particular natural realms?

2. Rhythmanalysis and the Critique of Everyday Life in the Modern World

Among the possible reasons for the general neglect of Henri Lefebvre’s idea of “rhythmanalysis,” developed toward the end of his long career, is the unusual breadth and wildness of the interdisciplinarity that it imagines, bringing together, according to one list, “history, climatology, cosmology, poetry, etc.” (Rhythmanalysis 16). From Lefebvre’s perspective, such interdisciplinarity is necessitated by the object he gives himself to think: human life as a site of complex interactions between a multiplicity of rhythmic forms, between “rhythms of the self” and “rhythms of the other,” (95) but also between natural rhythms and the rhythms fashioned by social imaginaries. Nowhere in his fragmentary reflections on rhythmanalysis does Lefebvre reflect on exactly what contribution to that field cosmology or climatology might make, which leaves a question for those working in the wake of his project. Given that he includes “poetry” alongside these two fields, and given that rhythmanalysis is the study of interactions and interferences (76) between different rhythmic measures, however, it would seem to be faithful to the original spirit of Lefebvre’s inquiry to develop a relatively expansive understanding of “cosmology” and “climatology.” Such an idea of cosmology would include poetic, cultural, or religious and natural or physical senses of these words, and it might also point to the inseparability of nature from cultural fields like ritual religion.

In his classic study of collective memory, Maurice Halbwachs observes that religions often “adapt themselves to seasonal variations” (92), but Halbwachs does not raise as a theoretical problem the medial form of life established by the interaction between the cultural rhythms of religion and the natural cycles of seasonal time. What Lefebvre calls “interaction,” Augustin Berque calls médiance. He makes this neologism a term of art, defining it as a “passage of sense between nature and society, between the physical world and the phenomenal world” (Médiance 33). Take the notion of a “passage of sense [sens],” or meaning, as that which makes possible any metaphor or analogy between that natural order and affective order. Berque wants to move away from a conception according to which humans and the natural world within which they dwell are taken as entities exterior to each other and subsequently coordinated by thinking, and to move toward a better understanding of the earth “insofaras it is inhabited by humanity” (Êtres humains sur la terre 78). Such an approach leads him to study “ecosymbolics,” understood as the appropriation “at once material and semantic” of the physical world (79). Religions once furnished the semantic elements out of which an ecosymbolics could be fashioned, and the weakening hold of such elements constitutes part of the crisis of modernity, according to Berque (80). Under the rubric of a new mode of thought that he calls “mesology,” drawing inspiration from the Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsuro’s notion of fudosei, Berque’s work attempts to study the ambiguities that constitute the milieus within which humans dwell (Médiance 48). In this section, we will first clarify the significance of seasons for Lefebvre’s project, before showing how Berque’s idea of médiance provides a helpful corrective to some of Lefebvre’s simplifications and shortcomings.

Although cultural studies in the years since its propagation has generally neglected the study of the seasons of the natural world, one of the founding texts of cultural studies, the first (1947) volume of Lefebvre’s Critique de la vie quotidienne gives an interpretation of the cultural
significance of seasonal cycles that is also a meditation on religion in the modern world and
perhaps the earliest anticipation of his rhythmanalytical project. As such, it demonstrates in
exemplary fashion the theoretical connection between seasonal variations and religious life.
There is an uneven quality to the volume in question, with technical discussions of Marx as a
philosopher flanked by comparatively more free-wheeling excursions into the worlds of literature
and culture. Chapter 5, which follows on the heels of an account of Marxism as critical knowledge
of “how we live” and even, strikingly, as a contribution to an “art of living” (196-200), marks a
somewhat abrupt shift in analytical modality, as Lefebvre begins to reflect on rural community
life, culminating in a poignant, personal reflection on the shape of the Christian rite as celebrated
in a church close to where Lefebvre himself grew up. The chapter evokes a qualitatively rich
world of everyday life with origins in ancient societies, but which persists in the contemporary
world in (often threatened) rural communities. This richness stands in stark contrast to the level
of everyday life as Lefebvre perceives it in the post-industrial world. Ancient and rural societies
are more attuned to forms of cyclical time than are modern societies, dominated as they are by the
temporality of the atomic clock. Two forms of cyclical time, broadly construed, are pertinent here,
and they are connected to each other: rite or ritual and the seasons.

The question of cyclical time in these forms is one that traverses Lefebvre’s oeuvre. In his outline
of rhythmanalysis as a mode of inquiry, he describes rites and rituals (both religious and secular)
as being doubly rhythmic: their periodic recurrence in everyday life grants a rhythm to social time
in a given community, and they themselves are also marked by a rhythm internal to them
(Rhythmanalysis 94). Their own rhythm, that is to say, interacts with the other rhythms constituting
the fabric of the ordinary in a given place and time. Forty years earlier, in a rural rather than an
urban context, Lefebvre was meditating on the ways in which communities bind the time of their
lives to the times of the physical world. By establishing a particular form of social time on the
basis of the “material,” so to speak, of the natural world, communities establish a regularity that
would be common to the calendar of festivals and to the astronomical seasons (203). Here is
perhaps the one topic pertaining to religiosity, and treated in Lefebvre’s oeuvre with respect, to
which he does not apply a form of a standard Marxist critique. Because “ritual” and “magic” are
primary tools by which the societies in question give this form to lived time, they contribute to
the richness of everyday life that Lefebvre celebrates (and whose slow disappearance he mourns)
in this chapter, evoking a time when “man [sic] cooperated with nature; he maintained and
regulated its energies, both by his real work and by the (fictitious) effectiveness of his magic”
(205).

Even in the age of secular modernity, Lefebvre thinks, a cultural memory of the lived significance
of the seasons (especially the winter solstice and the return of spring) persists, but without the
“Dionysian joy” that characterizes archaic and rural celebrations. Marcel Mauss seems to make a
similar observation in reviewing his friend and colleague Henri Hubert’s 1906 essay on
representations of time in religion and magic. There he suggests that the contemporary European
problem that solicits Hubert’s tranhistorical and transcultural study of the ways in which
religious symbols and practices construct social time is the problem of the secular. Hubert’s essay
ends with the startling claim that the original function of calendars is essentially religious.
Despite the apparent rigidity with which calendars organize time, despite the homogeneity they
seem to impose, their real purpose is actually the marking of those days and seasons that are
heterogeneous in relation to quotidian time. In his review, Mauss takes the step that Hubert does
not: he considers the impact of the advent of secular modernity on this immemorial function of
the calendar. “Today,” Mauss writes, “religious chronology remains caught in . . . limbo, for a
significant part of our mental activity continues to depend on old ways [that is, theological or
ecclesiastical ways] of counting and classifying” (94), old ways, that is, of marking time, of
endowing the inexorable flow of the irreversible with rhythms that are experienced, learned, and
that become the basis of expectations and desires. Even in an era over which homogeneous time
holds sway, old modes of time-reckoning and synchronizing communal life with the physical
3. Mesology and the Philosophical Dignity of the Sensible

We shall return to Mauss, who establishes the seasons as a question of the social in an early study of Eskimo life, in the following section. First, however, we wish to suggest a slight corrective or revision to Lefebvre’s rhythmanalytical project, beginning from Berque’s work. Lefebvre presents his project as one of recovering the “dignity” of the “sensible “within philosophy (Rhythmanalysis 21). To accomplish this task, however, more is needed than a simple empiricist reversal, whereby physical and natural along with cultural objects and phenomena become the objects of discourse. Instead, Lefebvre needs (and lacks) an idea of sense and the sensible that would attune us to the ambiguities constitutive of sense itself as a bearer of human existence on the earth. A symptom of this theoretical lacuna is that Lefebvre associates symbols and symbolisms with the “cosmic rhythms” of rural life without accounting for this connection between a form of lived time, a form of social life, and a symbolic form (see Critique II 302). “Sense” itself, as Jean-Luc Nancy has suggested, commenting on Hegel, is a kind of “transport” or “passage” between sense construed as immediate intuition of a sensory manifold “out there” and sense construed as the meaning or thought of what is thus apprehended (46). Likewise, as we have already seen, for Berque, a human “milieu” is a “passage of sense between nature and society, between the physical world and the phenomenal world.” By virtue of its object, mesology gives itself the paradoxical task of “raisonner la sensibilité, sensibiliser la raison” (Médiance 86). Berque gives us a richer vocabulary for talking about interaction and interference than Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis provides because he shows how these kinds of relationships between varying rhythmic measures and time scales result in a meaning or sense of a given milieu that is nonetheless irreducible to a semiotics (42). The sense of a milieu, as we have noted, is its médiance, but Berque does not limit this relationship to ancient and rural societies (which is not to say that he would not agree with Lefebvre’s analysis of a significant shift, for the worse, in this natural-social relationship), making it instead a veritable anthropological principle: médiance determines a way of “being human on the earth.” It defines a movement of existing, in the strong sense of holding oneself [sistere] outside [ex] in the open, of moving outside of oneself (Écoumène 127). An understanding of this middleness, intermediarity, and relatedness is necessary to account for seasonality as a condition of human existence, as identified in the comment by Biran that we cited in the introduction. Berque’s work indicates a powerful approach to this sensory significance of the seasons because it brings into focus the more general fact of “being-between” nature and culture as a “power of movement “that characterizes human life (Écoumène 126). We shall therefore let it inform our discussion in the final sections of the paper.

4. The Rhythmanalysis of Eskimo Societies by Mauss and Beuchat

Let us now consider the stakes of these theoretical perspectives on seasonality and the relation between phenomenal and physical orders of things by turning to a concrete example: the seasonal variations characteristic of northern peoples, especially the Inuit of Canada and Greenland. As noted above, this region is particularly pertinent for the problem of seasonality for several reasons. This problem is the subject of a 1906 study written by Marcel Mauss with the help of Henri Beuchat, itself the product of a seminar given at the Sorbonne in 1904-05 on the basis of European and North American texts about Eskimo life. The basic fact that they give themselves to think in that book is a phenomenon identified by many of the explorers, ethnographers, and missionaries who wrote about circumpolar life before them: Eskimo life is characterized by winters filled with intense social, festive, and religious activity, with all the members of a community living very close to one another in a settlement, and summers when families disperse to spend time away from the rest of the community and the only rituals observed are those associated with birth and death. Together with this division of activities goes a concomitant division of all material objects and persons into categories according to their association with “winter” or “summer” (60). In the arctic, a place of extremes, a very dark winter gives way rather
quickly to summer days marked by very long sunlight. Correlatively, there is an alternation between a very concentrated social life and a relaxation or reversal of this concentration that corresponds exactly to the seasons of winter and summer. The core thesis put forward by Mauss and Beuchat is that this “rhythm of concentration and dispersion” (56) fulfills a “natural need” of human beings, who cannot sustain an intense communal life indefinitely (79). Insofar as they ascribe to “each social function” a “rhythm of its own,” the book can be seen as a predecessor to Lefebvre’s idea of rhythmmanalysis (79). Like Lefebvre, they also emphasize the survival of these rhythmic forms of concentration and dispersion in modernity (e.g. those brief times of year, usually during the summer, during which it seems that everyone leaves the cities to go on holiday; 78). Moreover, they provide an example of the sort of temporal binding-together of social life with the life of nature that Lefebvre mourns in the chapter from the Critique of Everyday Life that we discussed above. Lefebvre seems to mourn, in particular, the loss of the ancient and rural “festival” in the quotidian modern world. Winter festivities, more than anything else, Mauss and Beuchat explain in their account of the effect of seasonal variations on Inuit religious life, express “the feeling which the community has of itself” (58).

Mauss and Beuchat’s central question is the following: what is the function of this seasonal variation common to communal and natural life? Their conclusion is that “the seasons are not the direct determining cause of the phenomena they occasion; they act, rather, upon the social density that they regulate” (79). This statement, which is meant to clarify the relationship between a material (seasonal) substratum and the stratum of social life that overlays it, so to speak, is itself dense and demands further reflection and clarification. This is especially true given the anthropological ambition of the concluding chapter in which it appears, that is, its ambition to say something about an inherent human need for a social life that expands and contracts, as it were. What does it mean to claim that, in relation to social time, the cyclical time of the seasons does not function causally but nevertheless has a regulatory purpose? That life among the Inuit is characterized by what we could call seasonal affective order is unquestionable, but what is the seasons’ mode of acting upon social life, if it is not causal? It is here, I think, that the basic theoretical gesture of Berque might be of use. Recall that this basic gesture consists in attempting to formulate a “principle of integration that takes account of both subjective or phenomenal transformations (metaphors) and objective or physical transformations (metabolisms, ecological cycles), which converge in giving a unitary sense to a milieu” (Médiance 36-7). This principle accords with the unwillingness of Mauss and Beuchat to make claims about causation. Rather than a unidirectional determinism, Berque’s work prompts us to consider the possibility that the seasonally regulated or “rhythmed” life of circumpolar peoples is a more complex mediation between the specific space-time of a community and its material substratum.

5. Some Passages of Sense

But to advance this line of thought, more work on the side of “subjective or phenomenal transformations” among the Inuit would be needed. In the final section of this paper, we outline some areas of cultural life that illustrate the circulation between social, poetic, natural, and affective registers that rhythmmanalysis and mesology bring into view. Such a perspective could effectively supplement the framework of Mauss and Beuchat. Nowhere in their book do Mauss and Beuchat discuss, for example, the important Inuit concept of sila. As the work of Bernard Saladin d’Anglure, who himself acts as a kind of go-between or mediator between cosmography or astronomy and cosmology, has shown, this concept endows the seasons with a symbolic and ritual significance essential for the understanding of the seasonal regulation of religious and social life in the arctic regions. Mauss and Beuchat themselves recognized that there must be more fine-grained rhythms than the binary alternation they discuss, and Saladin d’Anglure shows how, even within the single season of winter, the rhythm of the moon and its declination is of social significance. The Inuit calendar “is a lunar-solar one [in which] the moon and the sun form a system, as much in physical reality as in symbolic representations,” which system furnishes an
example of “the dynamic unity of opposites in sila, which remains the great cosmic referent of the universe” (207). The function of the winter religious festivals is not merely to ensure the “continued subsistence” of the collective (Mauss and Beuchat 59), but to restore this unity of sila through a linking of “the myths and rites of shamanistic space-time to the social time of the people” at a time of year when “the great equilibrium of sila and the universe seemed challenged” (208). Saladin d’Anglure shows how this process is understood according to a mythologization of the sun, moon, and the polar bear as a creature that passes easily between the worlds of land and water. We shall not go into these details here, simply noting instead the integration of astronomical “selenocentric computation” and a metaphorical or mythological understanding of reality. In this instance, observation and narrativization of the natural world interpenetrate each other in a passing of sense between human communities and the terrestrial firmament.

Yet there is another, perhaps even more telling respect in which sila is a relevant concept for our discussion of seasonality and médiance. According to A. Nicole Stuckenberger, who has done extensive ethnographic work with Inuit in Canada, this concept demonstrates that weather and climate are irreducible to the plane of the natural world, according to the traditional Inuit understanding. She explains that sila has as connotations “universe,” “sky,” and “weather” alike (Thin Ice, 33), enumerating, in addition, a number of composite Igloolik expressions that include this term. To cite a few: “Silatuwaq: S/he is intelligent, has understanding/sense . . . Silaujuualuq: A very intelligent or reasonable person . . . SilaapInua: Spirit master of the universe . . . Silalututuq: Bad weather” (Thin Ice 33). It would seem that the understanding or intelligence in question here depends on a relationship to the natural and spiritual order of things, rather than being intellect in the abstract sense. The semantic richness of the morpheme sila highlighted by Stuckenberger seems to accord rather nicely with médiance taken as a sense of the milieu that we have been working to develop throughout this paper, as a passage between natural and subjective or phenomenal forms of sense, between sense as apprehension and sense as understood meaning.

Now, by allying rhythm-analyses with sociology, Lefebvre runs the risk of “recasting the arbitrary as necessary” that is common to all sociological projects (Rancière, 204). Yet Lefebvre is in fact concerned – perhaps above everything – with possibility, both with understanding what in the past made the present possible, and with nurturing the emergence of the new. The burden of his critique of everyday life is to display the non-immutability of a specific level of existence within the order of things, to analyze “what can and ought to change in human reality” (Critique II 97; see also 63). The ultimate object of this critical project is the changeable, the possible. Therefore it is appropriate that we conclude our study by taking note of some of the notable changes that are taking place and that have already taken place in the kinds of Arctic cultures we have been discussing and that are relevant for the issues raised in this paper.

One of the reasons we gave at the outset for focusing on the seasons in circumpolar life was the remarkable changes the circumpolar regions have undergone even in the hundred years that have passed since the publication of Mauss and Beuchat’s classic study. Stuckenberger’s work allows us to register a few such changes. For example, she notes that, for the Inuit, seasonal change is not strictly regulated according to the calendar, but is instead connected to the formation and break-up of ice floes (Community106). Therefore, as reduced sea ice continues to be observed as an effect of the general warming of the Arctic (Walsh and Chapman), this alteration of the landscape has consequences for the rhythms that regulate social life among the Inuit.

Another major cultural change is contact with Europeans and the Christianization of the Canadian Inuit. The work of Frédéric Laugrand and Jarich Oosten has shown that the Inuit adoption of Christianity, though resulting in major changes especially with respect to shamanistic practices, did not cause a simple cultural “loss,” but illustrates instead the “amazing creativity” and “cultural innovation” on the part of the Inuit who integrated Christian symbols and practices into their traditional belief system (Inuit Shamanism 35). On the basis of interviews with community elders, they discern a number of Christian ideas that the Inuit themselves seem to
have found attractive ("Shamans and Missionaries" 181).

As for post-contact seasonal variation more generally, Stuckenberger suggests that in the century since they organized and interpreted the existing ethnographic data on the topic, the patterns described by Mauss and Beuchat with respect to the seasons is precisely the reverse of what they observed in the literature of their day: "whereas the winter camp was the ideal social configuration in Mauss and Beuchat's description, it is the spring/summer camp that is perceived by Inuit to be the ideal configuration at present" (Community 134). One possible explanation for this reversal lies in the association of life on the land in the summer camps with older, traditional practices that have been occluded if not forgotten in post-contact modernity (122). Movement and rhythm characterize traditional Inuit community, and among the effects of contact with Europeans was an interruption of this movement in the form of "programs for the sedentarization of the Inuit" (38). Social life in winter settlements, then, become associated, to some extent, with colonization, and social life in summer camps becomes an escape from the sedentarization effected by colonization, are connection with traditional ways of life, and a time for visiting and socializing with people outside the family unit. There is still a rhythm of concentration and dispersion associated with particular seasons, but the social signification or valuation has changed slightly.

Nonetheless, winter festivity retains the “intimacy” observed by the writers Mauss and Beuchat summarized a century ago, although it now employs the Christian symbols of Christmas (Quviaisuwik, literally, “place/time of joy”). Laugrand and Oosten give as an example of Inuit creativity and innovation the integration of Christian symbols and imagery into the traditional winter celebrations (Inuit Shamanism 69-100). It would be incorrect, they show, to elide the processes of colonization and Christianization too closely in this case. Unlike instances of missionary activity in other times and places, as Stuckenberger also emphasizes, the Canadian Inuit were not forced to become Christian; they were not passive recipients of an alien theological system, but savvy cultural innovators. For example, in addition to reinventing the traditional winter feasts in the image of Christmas, they developed their own ceremony (siqqitirmiq) to mark an individual’s transition to Christianity, which involves the eating of a food that was not permitted by traditional mores: the heart of a seal (“Shamans and Missionaries” 171). As Laugrand and Oosten put it, with such rituals, “Inuit shaped their own conversion” (“Shamans and Missionaries” 182).

Needless to say, however, circumpolar cultures and religions, along with their experiences of contact with Europeans, differ widely. So do reactions to these experiences. What anthropologists Oosten and Laugrand characterize as creative adaptation of Christian symbols, Greenlandic activist Aqqaluk Lynge describes as a “manipulation of the mind and spirit” more powerful than any “military force” (Inuit35). His poetry poignantly attests to a resentment of the changes brought by Europeans to his island. He speaks, for example, of the contemporary practice of Inuit traditions as an imitation of the “life that was ours / that was once our own” (Taqqat 102). Today, the social life of native Greenlanders is subjected to the indifferent “calendar without days” by which the Danish colonizers organized their own time (in Greenland; 104). An analysis of the variety of possible perspectives that could be taken and that have been taken on the history of contact between Inuit and Europeans would constitute a task for an entirely different paper. As Lynge himself notes, the “spiritual invasion” of Christian missionaries, because it resulted in both positive and negative effects, “is difficult for posterity to pass judgment on” (Inuit 36). However, the process according to which traditional practices were transformed to accommodate Christianity and European cultural patterns is interpreted, what is unquestionable is the transformation effected by this process on macro time scales.

In conclusion, one reason for preferring to describe the relation between the natural world and social life as regulatory (or rhythmic) and not as causal in a straightforward, unidirectional way is that a causal model presumes that the two terms in the relationship – the material substratum and
the social realm—stand over against each other. Berque’s mode of thinking attunes us to the middleness characteristic of every human milieu, the spacing and relatedness characteristic of human life vis-à-vis its earthy support. Lefebvre’s rhythm-analytical project encourages us to think about this relation in terms of time, especially insofar as societies produce qualitatively different times (different in comparison to other societies, but also different inasmuch as different segments of the calendar year are experienced as having differing affective tonalities). It also reminds us of the mutability of such forms of time. While we can be grateful to scholars like Laugrand and Oosten for the work they have done on this question in the Canadian context, the history of modern religions in the circumpolar region, taken as a whole, still remains to be written. Such a history would need to include an account of the profound transformations on this particular level of forms of time and forms of life, of seasonality as a relation between temporal physical changes and the organization of meaning and affect on individual and collective levels. We hope that the perspective developed in this paper at least poses some of the questions that such future investigations might begin to answer in more detail.

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